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Abstract	
In	 a	 recent	 book	 and	 an	 article,	 Carl	 Craver	 construes	 the	 relations	 between	
different	levels	of	a	mechanism,	which	he	also	refers	to	as	constitutive	relations,	
by	 means	 of	 mutual	 manipulability	 (MM).	 Interpreted	 metaphysically,	 MM	
implies	 that	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 symmetrical.	MM	 thus	 violates	 one	 of	 the	
main	desiderata	of	scientific	explanation,	namely	explanatory	asymmetry.	Parts	
of	 Craver’s	 writings	 suggest	 a	 metaphysical	 interpretation	 of	 MM,	 and	 Craver	
explicitly	 commits	 to	constitutive	 relationships	being	symmetrical.	The	present	
paper	 draws	 attention	 to	 this	 shortcoming	 of	 Craver’s	 account.	 The	 paper	
furthermore	 explores	 the	 option	 of	 interpreting	 MM	 epistemologically,	 as	 a	
means	 for	 individuating	mechanisms.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	MM	 then	 is	 redundant.	
MM	should	therefore	better	be	abandoned.		
	
1 Introduction	
Ever	 since	Machamer,	Darden,	 and	Craver	 (2000)’s	 landmark	 article	 “Thinking	
about	 mechanisms”,	 mechanistic	 explanations—thought	 to	 be	 the	 most	
pervasive	kinds	of	explanation	in	the	biological	sciences—have	become	a	major	
research	 topic	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 Machamer	 et	 al.	
characterize	 mechanisms	 as	 being	 “composed	 of	 both	 entities	 (with	 their	
properties)	and	activities.	Activities	are	the	producers	of	change.	Entities	are	the	
things	 that	 engage	 in	 activities”	 (3).	 To	provide	 a	mechanistic	 explanation	of	 a	
phenomenon,	 then	 is	 “to	explain	how	 it	was	produced”	 by	 a	mechanism	 (ibid.).	
The	 production	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 in	 question	 by	 a	 mechanism,	 call	 it	 MPP	
(mechanistic	 production	 of	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon),	 is	 thus	 absolutely	
central	 to	 the	 mechanistic	 conception	 of	 explanation.	 Although	 not	 explicitly	
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highlighted	by	Machamer	et	al.,	MPP	thus	ensures	that	the	mechanistic	account	
of	 explanation	 captures	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 desiderata	 on	 accounts	 of	
explanation:	 explanatory	 asymmetry.	 Mechanisms	 explain	 phenomena,	 but	
phenomena	 do	 not	 explain	 mechanism,	 because	 mechanisms	 produce	
phenomena	 and	 not	 vice	 versa.	 The	 direction	 of	 explanation	 thus	 follows	 the	
direction	 of	 a	 mechanism’s	 production	 of	 the	 relevant	 phenomenon.	 This	
assumption	 is	 in	 fact	 analogous	 to	 an	 assumption	 made	 by	 large	 parts	 of	 the	
philosophical	 literature	 on	 causation,	 perhaps	 most	 explicitly	 put	 by	 Salmon	
(1998,	129):	“The	asymmetry	of	explanation	is	inherited	from	the	asymmetry	of	
causation”	(see	also	Strevens	2008b,	24f.	and	76‐7).	And	indeed,	although	mostly	
concerned	 with	 the	 descriptive	 project	 of	 drawing	 to	 the	 attention	 of	
philosophers	 the	 importance	 of	 mechanistic	 explanations,	 Machamer	 et	 al.	 do	
express	broad	and	general	sympathy	with	a	causal	process	theory	for	MPP	in	the	
tradition	 of	 Salmon’s	 (1984)	 early	 work	 on	 causation.	 Process	 theories	 of	
causation,	 however,	 have	widely	 been	 acknowledged	 to	 fail	 on	 various	 counts	
(Hitchcock	1995).		
	 In	 his	 recent	 book	 (Craver	 2007)	 and	 an	 article	 (Craver	 and	 Bechtel	
2006),	Craver	offers	 important	refinements	of	 the	original	mechanistic	account	
by	Machamer	 et	 al.	 Amongst	 other	 things,	 Craver	 proposes	 to	 understand	 the	
relation	between	 the	mechanism	and	 the	explanandum	phenomenon	 (i.e.,	MPP	
relation)	 in	 terms	 of	 “mutual	 manipulability”,	 which,	 by	 a	 reviewer,	 has	 been	
judged	“one	of	the	main	achievements	of	the	book“	(Levy	2009,	141).	 It	will	be	
the	purpose	of	this	paper,	to	assess	this	aspect	of	Craver’s	account.		
This	 is	 how	 I	 proceed.	 In	 Section	 2	 I	 introduce	 Craver’s	 notion	 of	 mutual	
manipulability	(MM)	as	an	explication	of	MPP.	I	argue	that	Craver’s	explication	of	
MPP	 strips	 the	 mechanistic	 account	 of	 explanation	 of	 its	 ability	 to	 capture	
explanatory	 asymmetry.	 In	 Section	 3	 I	 explore	ways	 in	which	 this	 undesirable	
consequence	might	be	avoided.	One	option	I	highlight	is	the	interpretation	of	MM	
as	a	purely	epistemological	criterion	for	identifying	MPP’s.	As	I	argue	in	Section	
4,	 however,	 there	 is	 clear	 textual	 evidence	 that	 Craver	 intends	 MM	 as	 an	
explication	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 MPP,	 which	 I	 argue	 is	 a	 genuinely	metaphysical	
project.	 Regardless,	 I	 show	 in	 Section	 5	 that,	 if	 interpreted	 in	 pure	
epistemological	 terms,	 MM	 becomes	 redundant.	 In	 Section	 6	 I	 conclude	 this	
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paper	 by	 recommending	 the	 abandonment	 of	 MM	 and	 by	 pointing	 to	 one	
characteristic	 of	mechanisms	 that	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	mechanistic	 approach	
might	 want	 to	 focus	 on	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 the	 need	 for	 special	 accounts	 of	
mechanistic	explanations.				
2 Explanatory	asymmetry	lost?		
Just	 like	 Machamer	 at	 al.	 (2000),	 Craver	 (2007,	 6‐7)	 defines	 mechanisms	 as	
“entities	 and	 activities	 organized	 such	 that	 they	 exhibit	 the	 explanandum	
phenomenon”.	 Craver’s	 (and	 Machamer	 et	 al.’s)	 standard	 example	 for	 a	
mechanistic	 explanation	 is	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 neuronal	 action	 potential,	
which	 “is	 explained	 by	 reference	 to	 component	 parts	 of	 the	 action	 potential	
mechanism”,	whereby	 examples	 for	 component	 entities	 are	 ions,	 ion	 channels,	
protein	 chains,	 etc.	 and	 examples	 for	 component	 activities	 are	 diffusion	
processes,	and	changes	in	confirmation	(121‐2).		
Craver	distinguishes	between	a	lower	and	an	upper	level	in	mechanisms	
(6‐7).	At	the	lower	level	he	locates	the	entities	X	and	their	properties	or	activities	
,	 and	 the	 ‘upper’	 level	 is	 constituted	by	 the	phenomenon	 to	be	explained.	The	
‘mechanism	 as	 a	 whole’,	 i.e.,	 X,	 ,	 and	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon,	 Craver	
denotes	 as	S.	 Furthermore	he	 treats	 the	phenomenon	 to	be	 explained	as	being	
equivalent	 to	S’s	activity	.	MPP	then,	 in	Craver’s	 terminology,	 is	S’s	‐ing	(i.e.	
the	 explanandum	 phenomenon)	 being	 “exhibited”	 or	 “produced”	 (Craver	 uses	
both	 terms)	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 mechanism’s	 components	 (X’s	 ‐ing).	
Furthermore,	even	though	of	minor	 importance	 in	the	 following,	 for	Craver	(as	
for	 Machamer	 et	 al.)	 mechanisms	 often	 consist	 of	 multiple	 levels.	 That	 is,	 the	
upper	 level	of	one	mechanism	may	be	a	component	of	a	 lower	 level	of	another	
mechanism,	and	so	on.	More	importantly,	Craver	sharply	distinguishes	between	
intra‐level	 and	 inter‐level	 relations	 (Craver	 and	 Bechtel	 2006;	 Craver	 2007).	
Whereas	 intra‐level	 relations	 are	 causal	 relations,	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 not;	
they	 are	 so‐called	 constitutive	 relations.	 Constitutive	 relations—in	 contrast	 to	
causal	relations—are	symmetric,	synchronous,	and	part‐whole	relations	(153‐4).	
Although	not	made	very	explicit	by	Craver,	constitutive	relationships	are	meant	
to	specify	MPP,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	following.	
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In	 order	 to	 elucidate	 inter‐level	 relationships	 in	 mechanisms,	 Craver	
(2007),	following	Woodward	(2003),	adopts	the	notion	of	an	ideal	intervention:	
“an	ideal	intervention	I	on		with	respect	to		is	a	change	in	the	value	of		that	
changes	,	 if	 at	 all,	 only	 via	 the	 change	 in	”	 (154).	 Interventions	 need	not	 be	
performable	by	humans,	nor	need	they	be	physically	possible.	All	that	is	required	
is	 that	 they	be	 logically	possible	 (see	Woodward	2003,	127ff.).	Craver	 (2007)’s	
explication	of	inter‐level	relations	in	terms	of	ideal	interventions	consists	of	two	
parts,	which	together	form	his	mutual	manipulability	criterion	(MM):		
(CR1):	When		is	set	to	the	value	1	in	an	ideal	intervention,	then		takes	on	the	
value	of	f(1).	(155)	
(CR2):	When		is	set	to	the	value	1	in	an	ideal	intervention,	then		takes	on	the	
value	of	f(1).	(159)	
Apparently,	 both	 CR1	 and	 CR2	 have	 the	 structure	 of	 Woodwardian	 active	
counterfactuals,	 i.e.,	 counterfactuals	 whose	 antecedents	 are	 “made	 true	 by	
interventions”	 (Woodward	 2000,	 199),	 which	 Woodward	 intends	 to	 pick	 out	
causal	relationships.	And	yet,	Craver	denies	that	neither	CR1	nor	CR2	do	so.	As	
mentioned	 above,	 the	 combination	 of	 CR1	 and	 CR2	 (i.e.	 MM)	 is	 supposed	 to	
individuate	 constitutive	 relations,	 which,	 according	 to	 Craver,	 are	 not	 causal	
relations.	 In	accordance	with	 the	convention	 in	 the	contemporary	 literature	on	
causation	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 causal	 relation	 between	 X	 and	 Y	 as	 X	 “being	 causally	
relevant”	 to	 Y	 (cf.	Woodward	2003,	 39),	 Craver	 also	 refers	 to	 CR1	 and	CR2	 as	
criteria	 for	 constitutive	 relevance.	 More	 specifically,	 “one	 can	 change	 the	
explanandum	 phenomenon	 by	 intervening	 to	 change	 a	 component	 [of	 a	
mechanism]”,	and	vice	versa,	“one	can	manipulate	the	component	by	intervening	
to	change	the	explanandum	phenomenon”	(153).	Craver	concludes	that		
many,	if	not	most,	causal	relationships	are	unidirectional.	In	contrast,	all	
constitutive	dependency	relationships	are	bidirectional	(153).		
And	 since	 inter‐level	 relationships	 are	 symmetrical	 relationships,	 they	 are	
therefore	 “only	uncomfortably	 viewed	as	 causal”	 (p.	 153).	Another	 reason	 that	
Craver	 mentions	 for	 constitutive	 relationships	 being	 distinct	 from	 causal	
relationships,	which	I	will	not	be	concerned	with	in	much	detail	here,	 is	that	 in	
the	former,	“’s	taking	on	a	particular	value	is	not	temporally	prior	to	’s	taking	
Page	5	of	15	
	
on	its	value”	(151‐2),	in	other	words,	constitutive	relationships	are	‘synchronic’,	
whereas	causal	relationships	are	not.	However,	contrary	to	what	Craver	seems	to	
suggest,	a	relationship	being	symmetrical	does	not	imply	that	it	cannot	be	causal.	
In	 fact,	 the	 account	 of	 causation	 Craver	 explicitly	 allows	 for	 ‘cyclic’	 causal	
relations	where	a	change	in	the	cause	variable	brings	about	a	change	in	the	effect	
variable	and	vice	versa	(Woodward	2003,	396).	Furthermore,	as	Leuridan	(2012,	
fn.	 27	 and	29)	 points	 out,	many	 relations	 of	 interest	 in	 neurobiology	 (Craver’s	
subject)	are	causal	feedback	loops,	i.e.,	symmetrical	causal	relationships.		
Craver’s	 explicit	 commitment	 to	 inter‐level	 relationships	 being	
symmetrical	 relationships	 raises	 the	 following	 concern:	 if	 inter‐level	
relationships	really	are	symmetrical,	what	is	 it	 in	Craver’s	account	that	ensures	
that	 the	 desideratum	 of	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	 respected?	 Recall,	 on	 the	
original	 mechanistic	 account	 by	 Machamer	 et	 al.,	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	
respected,	 because	 mechanisms	 produce	 phenomena,	 but	 not	 vice	 versa.	 The	
direction	 of	 explanation	 simply	 follows	 the	 direction	 of	 production.	 So	 what	
happened	to	the	production	relationship	in	Craver’s	account,	which	I	referred	to	
as	MPP,	and	which	Craver,	like	Machamer	et	al.,	characterizes	as	a	central	feature	
of	mechanisms?	At	one	point	in	his	book,	Craver	seems	to	say	that	MPP	is	to	be	
spelled	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 Woodwardian	 counterfactuals	 picking	 out	 causal	
relations:	
to	 say	 that	 one	 stage	 of	 a	mechanism	 is	productive	 of	 another	 (as	 I	 suggest	 in	
Machamer	et	al.	2000;	Craver	and	Darden	2001)	 is	 to	say,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 that	
one	 has	 the	 ability	 to	manipulate	 one	 item	 by	 intervening	 to	 change	 another.	
(93‐4;	added	emphasis)	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 however,	 for	 Craver	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 not	 causal	
relations.	 So	 if	 the	 above	 quotation	 were	 to	 refer	 to	 MPP	 (i.e.	 an	 inter‐level	
relation)	 Craver	 would	 clearly	 contradict	 himself.	 So	 despite	 speaking	 of	
“production”	 in	 this	one	passage,	 suggesting	 reference	 to	MPP,	Craver	 is	better	
read	as	spelling	out	intra‐level	causal	relations	here.	This	still	leaves	us	with	the	
question	of	how	MPP	is	to	be	understood.		
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In	 personal	 communication,2	 Craver	 is	 ready	 to	 give	 up	 on	 a	 ‘literal’	
reading	of	MPP;	he	suggests	MPP	be	interpreted	metaphorically	instead.	That	is,	
whenever	 we	 say	 that	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon	 is	 “produced”	 by	 the	
mechanism,	 what	 we	 should	 say	 more	 carefully	 is	 that	 the	 phenomenon	 is	
constituted	 or	 “made	 up”	 by	 the	mechanism,	 very	much	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	
constitutive	 understanding	 of	 inter‐level	 relations.	 This	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 one	
taken	in	Craver	and	Bechtel	(2006):		
The	causal	claims,	when	made	explicit,	are	all	intra‐level.	But	we	continue	to	talk	
about	bottom	up	causal	relation	[from	one	to	another	level]	when	we	are	being	
quick	or	informal	as	long	as	we	understand	that	the	change	at	the	higher	level	is	
mediated	by,	or	explicable	in	terms	of,	a	mechanism	[and	its	constitutive	
relations].	(ibid.,	557)		
In	this	context	it	is	furthermore	interesting	to	note	that	the	idea	of	MPP,	i.e.,	the	
idea	of	the	mechanism’s	producing	the	explanandum	phenomenon,	is	altogether	
absent	 from	 Craver	 and	 Bechtel’s	 joint	 paper.	 But	 again,	 construing	MPP	 as	 a	
symmetrical	 relation	 (namely	 as	 CR)	 subjects	 the	 mechanistic	 account	 to	 the	
problem	of	 explanatory	 symmetry.	 If	 the	 relation	between	 the	mechanism	and	
the	phenomenon	is	symmetrical,	what	is	it	that	prevents	us	from	saying	that	the	
phenomenon	also	explains	the	mechanism?	In	response	to	this	question,	Craver	
(personal	 communication)	 is	 ready	 to	 embrace	 a	 deflationary	 “explanatory	
pluralism”,	 implying	 that	 phenomena	 might	 as	 well	 explain	 mechanisms.	 But	
perhaps	there	are	more	appealing	options	for	Craver.		
3 Explanatory	asymmetry	saved?	
There	 is	 a	 much	 simpler	 response	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 explanatory	 symmetry	
available	to	Craver.	He	could	point	out	that	MM	is	only	part	of	how	constitutive	
relationships	 are	 to	 be	 understood.	 Another	 important	 aspect	 of	 constitutive	
relationships	 is	 that	 they	 are	 part‐whole	 relationships	 (see	 above	 and	 Craver	
2008,	153‐4).	Part‐whole	relationships	are	asymmetrical	 relationships:	 if		 is	a	
part	of		 then		 cannot	be	part	of	.	Explanatory	asymmetry	between		 and		
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would	 thus	 be	 secured.3	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 response,	 however,	 is	 that	 it	
stands	 in	 outright	 contradiction	 with	 Craver’s	 assertion	 that	 constitutive	
relationships	 are	 symmetrical:	 either	 constitutive	 relations	 are	 part‐whole	
relations	or	they	are	symmetrical.	Craver	cannot	have	it	both	ways.	Although	the	
former	 option	 seems	 much	 more	 plausible	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
explanatory	 asymmetry,	 part‐whole	 relations	 are	 underdeveloped	 in	 Craver’s	
account.	 In	 fact	 Leuridan	 (2012)	 argues	 that	 under	 the	 perhaps	most	 intuitive	
definition	of	part‐hood,	cases	of	mutual	causation	cannot	be	ruled	out	by	CR.	This	
is	contrary	to	Craver’s	insistence	that	constitutive	relations	are	different	in	kind	
from	causal	relations.	What	is	more,	Craver	puts	a	lot	of	stress	on	the	symmetry	
property	 of	 constitutive	 relations	 and	 characterizes	 it	 as	 one	 of	 the	 crucial	
differences	between	constitutive	and	causal	relations	(Craver	and	Bechtel	2006;	
Craver	 2007).	 At	 any	 rate,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 only	 two	 options	 for	 Craver:	 he	
either	gives	up	on	the	idea	that	constitutive	relations	are	symmetrical	or	he	tries	
to	 save	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 whilst	 holding	 onto	 constitutive	 relationships	
being	 symmetrical	 (and	 giving	 up	 on	 part‐hood).	 The	 former	 option	 appears	
much	more	plausible.	It	would	allow	Craver	to	embrace	the	asymmetry	property	
of	part‐whole	relations	and	thereby	explanatory	asymmetry.	But	because	Craver	
is	 so	 adamant	 about	 constitutive	 relations	 being	 symmetrical,	 let	 us	 briefly	
consider	the	latter	option,	before	exploring	the	former	option.		
Take	one	of	Woodward’s	preferred	examples,	the	ideal	gas	law.	This	law	
relates	variables	of	pressure	(P),	the	volume	of	a	gas	(V)	and	temperature	(T)	in	
the	 formula	 PV=RT	 (R	 is	 the	 gas	 constant).	 Clearly	 this	 is	 a	 symmetrical	
relationship.	 We	 can	 intervene	 on	 P	 to	 change	 T,	 and	 conversely,	 we	 can	
intervene	 on	 T	 to	 change	 P	 (by	 holding	 fixed	 V,	 respectively).	 Now,	 assuming	
(with	Woodward)	that	the	ideal	gas	law	is	an	explanatory	generalization,	in	each	
of	 the	 above	 scenario,	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	 preserved	 despite	 the	
relationship	 being	 a	 symmetric	 relationship.	 In	 the	 one	 context	 T	 is	 the	 cause	
variable	and	P	the	effect	variable,	and	in	another	context,	P	is	the	cause	variable	
and	T	the	effect	variable.	In	the	first	scenario	a	change	in	T	explains	the	change	in	
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P	 (but	 not	 vice	 versa),	 and	 in	 the	 second	 scenario	 P	 explains	 T	 (but	 not	 vice	
versa).4	 There	 is	 of	 course	 no	 a	 priori	 reason	 why	 this	 insight	 could	 not	 be	
extrapolated	 to	 the	 context	 of	 mechanistic	 explanations.	 However	 this	
extrapolation	 is	 only	 of	 a	 limited	 sort.	 It	 extends	 only	 to	 intra‐level	 but	 not	 to	
inter‐level	 relationships	 in	 mechanisms.	 That	 is,	 on	 one	 particular	 level	 of	 a	
mechanism	it	might	make	sense	to	say,	as	in	the	above	example,	that	a	change	in	
X1’s	1‐ing	explains	(in	a	minimal	sense)	a	change	 in	X2’s	2‐ing,	and	vice	versa	
(just	 in	case,	of	course,	X1	and	X2	are	related	as	P	and	T	above).	Further,	 it	also	
makes	sense	(now	between	different	levels	of	mechanisms)	to	say	that	if	we	can	
intervene	on	’s	to	change		(the	explanandum	phenomenon),	then	’s	explain	.	
However,	crucially,	it	makes	little	or	no	sense	to	say	the	reverse,	namely	that		
explains	 ,	 even	 if	 CR2	were	 satisfied.	 After	 all,	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon	
cannot	explain	the	mechanism,	at	least	not	in	the	standard	sense	of	the	term.	It	
therefore	seems	that	there	is	no	straightforward	way	in	which	Craver	could	stick	
to	his	symmetry	thesis	and	save	explanatory	asymmetry.		
Again,	Craver	could	simply	give	up	on	 the	symmetry	 thesis.	 Indeed,	MM	
implies	 the	 symmetry	of	 inter‐level	 relations	only	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	understood	as	 a	
metaphysical	explication	of	inter‐level	relations,	i.e.,	as	specifying	the	meaning	of	
inter‐level	 relations.	 If	 read	 in	 epistemological	 terms,	 that	 is,	 as	 a	 criterion	 for	
identifying	inter‐level	relations	(in	contrast	to,	say,	mere	correlations	between	a	
mechanism	 and	 some	 phenomenon),	 MM	 has	 no	 implications	 for	 the	
directionality	of	 inter‐level	 relations.	At	 least	a	priori,	 there	 is	no	contradiction	
between	inter‐level	relations	being	asymmetrical	and	our	means	for	identifying	
them	being	applicable	in	both	directions	of	this	relation	(i.e.,	bottom‐up	and	top‐
down).	 An	 epistemological	 interpretation	 of	 MM	 would	 also	 allow	 Craver	 to	
reconcile	 MM	 with	 the	 asymmetry	 of	 part‐hood.	 Unfortunately	 for	 Craver,	
however,	 there	 is	 strong	 textual	 evidence	 that	 Craver	 aims	 for	 a	metaphysical	
explication	of	constitutive	relevance	in	terms	of	MM.	So	before	we	can	consider	a	
pure	 epistemological	 interpretation	 of	 MM,	 we	 need	 to	 consider	 that	 textual	
evidence	in	more	detail.		
																																																								
4	This	was	suggested	to	me	by	Bert	Leuridan.		
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4 The	metaphysics	of	mechanisms	
First	and	 foremost,	as	pointed	out	above,	part	of	Craver’s	motivation	 to	amend	
the	original	mechanistic	account	by	Machamer	et	al.	is	clearly	owed	to	the	wish	
to	 explicate	 the	 meaning	 of	 MPP.	 Such	 endeavor	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 a	
genuinely	 metaphysical.	 Second,	 Craver’s	 concession	 that	 MM	 implies	 the	
symmetry	 of	 inter‐level	 relations	 clearly	 presupposes	 that	 MM	 is	 interpreted	
metaphysically.	 Again,	 if	 MM	 were	 a	 mere	 epistemological	 criterion,	 nothing	
would	 follow	 for	 the	 direction	 of	 inter‐level	 relations.	 Furthermore,	 Craver	
makes	clear	that	he	wishes	to	provide	a	‘normative’	account	that	can	“demarcate	
[mechanistic]	explanation	from	other	kinds	of	scientific	achievements”,	and	that	
can	 “reveal	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 explanations”,	 in	 other	 words	 it	 “should	
prescribe	norms	of	explanation”	(20;	original	emphasis).	All	this	he	could	not	do	
if	he	were	to	interpret	MM	epistemologically	rather	than	metaphysically.	One	e.g.	
cannot	 assess	 whether	 an	 explanation	 is	 a	 good	 explanation	 without	 having	
provided	 at	 least	 a	 partial	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 constitutes	 an	
explanation,	i.e.,	a	question	about	the	meaning	of	explanation.		
	 But	 again,	 there	 are	 indeed	 also	 a	 number	 of	 passages	 in	 Craver’s	 book	
that	suggest	that	Craver	views	MM	as	an	epistemological	criterion.	Primarily,	this	
is	suggested	by	the	context	in	which	Craver	explicates	inter‐level	relations.	This	
context	 is	 formed	 by	 Craver’s	 pointing	 to	 the	 various	 inter‐level	 experimental	
strategies	 that	 can	 be	 used,	 inter‐level	 bottom‐up	 and	 top‐down,	 to	 establish	
certain	 entities	 and	 activities	 as	 being	 part	 of	 a	 certain	mechanism.	 Verbatim,	
Craver	says:	
I	build	my	positive	account	[of	mechanisms]	by	considering	the	experimental	
strategies	that	neuroscientists	use	to	test	whether	a	given	entity,	activity,	
property,	or	organizational	feature	is	relevant	to	the	behavior	of	the	mechanism	
as	a	whole	[…]	(140;	added	emphasis).5	
Furthermore,	Craver	appears	to	think	that	a	non‐reductive	analysis	of	causation	
(or	constitution)	based	on	active	counterfactuals	implies	that	the	analysis	is	non‐
metaphysical.	Explicitly,	he	says	in	his	summary	of	Woodward’s	manipulationist	
																																																								
5	Couch	(2011,	fn.	6)	also	reports	that	Craver	explicitly	embraces	an	epistemological	
interpretation	of	MM	in	personal	communication.		
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account,	 which	 he	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 use	 to	 define	 constitutive	 relevance	 in	
mechanisms,	that		
I	do	not	discuss	here	whether	such	metaphysics	[of	causation]	is	required	or	
what	the	available	metaphysical	options	are.	Even	if	the	manipulationist	view	
does	not	identify	the	truth‐maker[s]	for	causal	claims,	it	is	nonetheless	an	
illuminating	analysis	of	the	causal	truths	themselves	[…]	(Craver	2007,	105‐7).		
This,	 however,	 is	 a	 misapprehension.	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 philosophical	 analysis	 is	
non‐reductive	does	not	imply	that	it	is	non‐metaphysical.	To	see	this	requires	a	
brief	excursion	into	Woodward’s	account.		
	 Many	 philosophical	 analyses	 seek	 to	 reduce	 the	 concept	 of	 causation	 to	
another	 concept.	 Humeans,	 for	 instance,	 reduce	 causation	 to	 mere	 empirical	
regularities.	 David	 Lewis	 reduces	 causation	 to	 counterfactual	 dependence.	
Woodward’s	 analysis	 of	 causation,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 decidedly	 non‐reductive.	
Woodward	defines	causal	relationships	as	generalizations	that	remain	invariant	
under	interventions.	As	Woodward	acknowledges,	the	notion	of	an	intervention	
is	itself	a	causal	notion.	In	a	sense,	Woodward’s	account	is	thus	circular.	However	
it	 is	 not	 viciously	 circular,	 as	Woodward	 (2003,	 20ff.)	 points	 out,	 because	 the	
causal	 relation	 that	 is	 being	 appealed	 to	 (I	 causing	 a	 change	 in	 X)	 is	 different	
from	the	causal	relation	that	 the	analysis	seeks	to	 illuminate	(namely,	X	causes	
Y).	Woodward	goes	on	to	show	that	such	a	non‐reductive	account	can	very	well	
be	insightful.	It	for	instance	delivers	markedly	different	verdicts	on	a	number	of	
important	 issues	(e.g.	action‐at‐a‐distance,	causation	by	prevention	or	absence)	
than	Salmon	(1984)’s	classical	causal	process	theory	of	causation	does.		
	 The	 crucial	 question	 now	 is	 of	 course:	 is	 a	 non‐reductive	 analysis	 of	
causation	 non‐metaphysical	 (as	 Craver	 would	 have	 it)?	 This	 is	 not	 an	
uncontroversial	 matter.	 In	 a	 slightly	 heated	 exchange	 with	 Strevens	 (2007,	
2008a),	 Woodward	 (2008)	 explicitly	 denies	 that	 his	 own	 account	 is	
metaphysical.	However	Strevens	 (2008)	offers	a	number	of	 convincing	 reasons	
why	Woodward	might	in	fact	be	mistaken	about	the	aims	of	his	own	book.	First,	
Woodward	(2003),	throughout	his	book,	presents	his	analysis	as	a	superior	rival	
to	 Lewis’s	 metaphysical	 analysis	 of	 causation.	 It	 would	 be	 hard	 to	 see	 why	
Woodward	 does	 that	 if	 the	 aim	 of	 his	 project	 were	 entirely	 different	 from	
Lewis’s.	 Second,	 Woodward	 seeks	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 according	 to	 which	
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causation	 is	 mind‐independent,	 in	 other	 words,	 an	 account	 of	 the	 nature	 of	
causation	which	is	independent	of	how	we	get	to	know	about	this	relation	(2003,	
118ff.).	This	clearly	is	a	metaphysical	endeavor.	Third,	Woodward	states	that	“my	
aim	is	to	provide	an	account	of	the	meaning	or	content	of	various	locutions,	such	
as	X	causes	Y”	and	that	“my	project	is	semantic	or	interpretive”	(38).	As	Strevens	
(2008)	points	out		
In	modern	times,	such	a	project	is	invariably	interpreted	as	aiming	to	provide	
truth	conditions	for	the	sentences	or	thoughts	in	question,	and	therefore	as	
aiming	to	specify	those	representations’	truthmakers.	It	may	look	like	semantics,	
but	it	is	also	a	kind	of	metaphysics	[…]	it	is	generally	agreed	that	a	word	with	an	
explicit	definition	has	as	its	extension	whatever	stuff	satisfies	that	definition.	If	
Woodward’s	causal	semantics	is	a	truth‐conditional	semantics,	he	is	inevitably,	
unavoidably,	ineluctably	committed	to	producing	an	account	of	the	truthmakers	
for	causal	talk,	a	metaphysics	of	causal	facts,	whatever	his	protestations.	(184)	
Back	to	Craver.	If	Craver	wishes	to	spell	out	the	meaning	of	the	inter‐level	
relation	in	terms	of	constitution	then,	by	Strevens’s	lights,	he	inextricably	
commits	himself	to	a	metaphysical	project.	Since	there	are	clear	signs	that	Craver	
does	wish	to	elucidate	the	meaning	of	inter‐level	relations	(see	above),6	his	
project,	contrary	to	what	he	says,	does	commit	him	to	a	metaphysics	of	
constitutive	relations.	And	since	Craver’s	spelling	out	of	inter‐level	relations	
implies	a	symmetrical	inter‐level	relation,	to	which	he	explicitly	commits,	the	
mechanistic	account	no	longer	captures	explanatory	asymmetry.	So	let	us	now	
finally	consider	the	possibility	of	interpreting	MM,	contrary	to	much	of	what	(is	
implied	by)	what	Craver	says	about	it,	as	a	merely	epistemological	tool	for	
individuating	constitutive	relationships.			
5 Individuating	mechanism	boundaries	
The	main	epistemological	function	of	MM	I	alluded	to	briefly	above	is	this:	it	
concerns	the	delineation	of	the	boundaries	of	mechanisms	(Craver	2007,	141ff).	
In	other	words	MM	is	supposed	to	specify	(i)	which	entities	and	activities	are,	
and	which	ones	are	not,	part	of	the	lower	level	of	a	mechanism	with	respect	to	a	
particular	explanandum	phenomenon	(this	function	is	performed	by	CR2),	and,	
																																																								
6	This	is	also	what	Craver	told	me	in	personal	communication.		
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conversely,	(ii)	which	phenomenon	is	picked	out	by	a	particular	mechanism	(this	
function	is	performed	by	CR1).	Craver	gives	the	following	example	(152).		
	 The	cognitive	capacity	of	word‐stem	completion,	in	which	a	subject	is	
presented	with	a	list	of	words	and	afterwards	asked	to	complete	the	word	stems	
of	the	words	presented	previously,	is	affected	by	changing	the	heart	rate	of	the	
subject.	That	is,	if	one	were	to	change	the	heart	rate	of	the	subject	(by	e.g.	
torturing	the	subject),	the	subject’s	capacity	to	complete	word	stems	would	
invariably	change.	According	to	CR1	alone,	however,	the	heart	rate	would	
erroneously	be	deemed	as	constitutively	relevant	for	the	phenomenon	of	word‐
stem	completion;	the	heart	rate	normally	would	not	be	considered	a	part	of	the	
mechanism	of	word	stem	completion,	or	so	Craver	reasons.	Here	is	where	CR2	
comes	in.	Engaging	subjects	in	word‐stem	completion	will	not,	under	normal	
circumstances,	result	in	a	different	heart	rate.	Hence	CR2	is	not	satisfied	by	the	
example	and	the	heart	rate	is	therefore	not	to	be	deemed	part	of	the	mechanism	
of	word	stem	completion.		
	 It	is	questionable	whether	MM	really	fulfills	the	purpose	Craver	foresees	
for	it.	To	see	this,	note	that	the	persuasiveness	of	the	above	example	rests	on	the	
implicit	assumption	that	the	relevant	mechanism	for	the	capacity	of	word	stem	
completion	is	a	cognitive	mechanism.	Only	then	the	heart	rate	appears	irrelevant.	
But	not	in	all	contexts	need	this	be	so.	In	contexts	in	which	one	is	interested	in,	
for	instance,	the	capacity	of	completing	word	stems	as	compared	to	the	absence	
of	any	cognitive	capacity,	the	heart	rate	appears	to	be	indeed	a	part	of	the	
relevant	mechanism.	In	other	words,	whether	or	not	a	mechanism	(or	part	
thereof)	is	relevant	to	the	explanation	of	a	phenomenon	is	subject	to	pragmatic	
considerations.	In	fact	Craver	is	very	well	aware	of	this.	He	for	instance	
highlights	the	importance	of	contrast	classes	in	the	specification	of	the	
explanandum	phenomenon	(2007,	202ff.).	And		
Once	the	explanandum	phenomenon	has	been	specified	[…]	it	is	then	an	objective	
matter	whether	or	not	it	is	possible	to	make	a	difference	to	that	effect	by	
manipulating	certain	antecedent	variables	and	which	manipulations	of	that	
variable	in	fact	make	a	difference.	My	account	is	thus	no	more	pragmatic	than	
any	view	of	causation	or	explanation	would	have	to	be.	(204)	
In	a	more	recent	publication,	Craver	(2009)	states	even	more	explicitly	that		
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[…]	the	spatial	and	causal	boundaries	of	mechanisms	depend	on	the	
epistemologically	prior	delineation	of	relevance	boundaries.	But	relevance	to	
what?	The	answer	is:	relevance	to	the	phenomena	that	we	seek	to	predict,	
explain,	and	control.	Within	the	boundaries	of	a	mechanism	are	all	and	only	the	
entities,	activities,	and	organizational	features	relevant	to	the	phenomenon	
selected	as	our	explanatory,	predictive,	or	instrumental	focus.	(591;	added	
emphasis)	
The	epistemological	function	CR2	is	supposed	to	perform,	namely	the	picking	out	
of	a	particular	mechanism,	given	a	particular	explanandum	phenomenon,	is	
therefore	not	necessary.	It	is	plausibly	carried	out	by	pragmatic	considerations:	
we	choose	a	particular	phenomenon	we	want	to	explain,	predict,	etc.	and	then	
we	ask,	by	reverse	engineering,	as	it	were,	what	causes	are	responsible	for	the	
phenomenon	in	question.	MM	as	an	epistemological	criterion	in	Craver’s	account	
looks	therefore	redundant.		
6 Conclusion			
When	interpreted	metaphysically,	MM,	in	violation	of	a	central	desideratum	of	
explanation,	implies	explanatory	symmetry	and	is	inconsistent	with	the	part‐
hood	characterization	of	constitutive	relevance	(as	I	argued	in	Section	2	and	
Section	3).	On	the	other	hand,	when	interpreted	epistemologically,	MM	does	not	
give	us	any	extra	purchase	on	the	individuation	of	mechanisms	(as	argued	in	the	
last	section).	I	therefore	believe	that	MM	is	better	to	be	abandoned	altogether.	I	
thus	disagree	with	Leuridan	(2012)	who	concludes	his	detailed	discussion	of	MM	
by	suggesting	that	mechanistic	inter‐level	relations	be	interpreted,	contrary	to	
Craver,	as	relations	of	mutual	causation.	But	such	a	proposal	is	of	course	just	as	
much	subject	to	my	criticism	of	explanatory	asymmetry	being	lost	(see	also	
Section	3).	Rather	I	think	that	inter‐level	relations,	i.e.	the	productive	relation	
MPP,	are	perhaps	best	understood	in	terms	of	unidirectional	Woodwardian	
counterfactuals	picking	out	causal	relations,	without	invoking	top‐down	
counterfactuals	(contra	Craver).	But	of	course,	there	would	then	be	no	need	for	a	
specific	mechanistic	account	of	explanation	(seeWoodward	2002).	So	is	there?	A	
crucial	feature	of	mechanisms	is	the	organization	of	entities	and	their	spatio‐
temporally	concerted	interaction	that	produces	a	phenomenon.	In	order	to	
accommodate	this	feature	of	mechanisms,	Woodward	(2011)	suggests	that	
counterfactuals	describing	causal	relations	in	mechanisms	possess	
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„characteristic	spatio‐temporal	signatures“	(427).	I	take	it	that	this	suggestion	
translates	into	mechanisms	being	specifiable	in	terms	of	conjunctions	of	active	
counterfactuals	with	complex	antecedents	of	the	following	form:		<If	an	
appropriate	intervention	I	had	changed	the	value	of	an	“entity	variable”	X	at	time	
t1	and,	if	an	appropriate	intervention	I	had	changed	the	value	of	an	“entity	
variable”	Y	at	time	t2,	and	…	etc.,	then	the	explanandum	phenomenon	would	
have	been	produced	by	the	mechanism	comprising	entities	X,	Y,	etc.>.	Since	it	
seems	awkward	to	say	that	variables	have	a	“location”,	spatial	information	might	
be	a	little	harder	to	accommodate	than	this.	At	any	rate,	barring	concerns	about	
the	modularity	assumption	that	Woodward	makes	(Cartwright	2002),	such	an	
amendment	of	Woodwardian	counterfactuals	to	accommodate	the	genuine	
mechanistic	feature	of	organization	and	concerted	interaction	of	mechanism‐
components	seems	to	be	unproblematic	in	principle.		
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